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Reasonable people might disagree whether the EU is likely to make a significant and 
commendable contribution to international investment law. Catharine Titi makes a 
powerful and in many ways persuasive argument in support of this likelihood. This reply 
will be limited to two issues where the materials put forward could also lend support to a 
different, if not necessarily better, reading. I will first consider the appropriateness of 
evaluating developments in international investment law through the analytical 
perspective of balance between (originally excessive) investor protection and (gradual 
recognition of) the right to regulate.1 It will be suggested that the apparent consensus on 
the meaning of ‘balancing’ may sometimes obfuscate certain less obvious issues at play. 
Secondly, the contribution of the recent EU practice will be briefly examined,2 finding it 
less interesting and innovative than one might have expected.  
 
2. The Fog of Balancing  
 
International investment law represents a balance between the competing interest of 
investors to protection from unfair treatment and the interest of the host State to 
exercise its regulatory powers.3 That is not an unusual proposition about international 
law. One could describe many regimes of international law as balancing competing 
                                                          
 Lecturer, Faculty of Laws, University College London. Email: m.paparinskis@ucl.ac.uk.   
1 See also C. Titi, The Right to Regulate in International Investment Law (2014).  
2 See also Titi, ‘Le “droit de réglementer” et les nouveaux accords de l'Union européenne sur 
l’investissement’, 39 Journal du droit international (2015) 64.  
3 Lowe, ‘Regulation or Epropriation’, 55 CLP (2002) 447, at 450.  
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interests of different kinds.4 But taking an uncontroversial general description and 
loading it too heavily with legal or systemic significance may lead the inquiry into a bank 
of fog. One example of what I have in mind in relation to investment law is 
‘depoliticisation’: a concept that (at its best) means everything for everybody, with little 
independent analytical value,5 but may also be significantly misleading, suggesting with 
persuasive force that certain positive rules have (not) been created, or that certain legal 
solutions would (not) fit the existing regime.6 Another example is ‘regulatory chill’: a 
perspective that takes complex inquiries about content of rules and compliance with 
rules and conflates them into a single question, presented from an entirely odd angle. In a 
similar vein, there are two reasons to be cautious about focusing on changes in treaty 
language to identify the (re)balancing of interests in investment law: first, it may miss or 
simplify important elements in international investment law; secondly, it may leave aside 
systemic assumptions that have to be taken into account if the balance is to be properly 
calibrated. I will address these concerns in turn.  
 
A. What is Being Balanced  
 
I would not want to overstate my first concern. I am not suggesting that there is nothing 
of interest to be gained from an examination of changes in investment treaty practice.7 
But there are four qualifications, none of them particularly original or controversial, that 
have to be made to an argument that an examination of changes in treaty language can 
demonstrate changes in international law. The first qualification is a technical one. 
Identification of the meaning of treaty rules by reference to their textual expression may 
provide a glimpse of the ordinary meaning of terms, but would fall short of the full 
inquiry mandated by principles of treaty interpretation expressed in the Vienna 
Convention on the Law of Treaties: calibrating ordinary meaning by context, object and 
                                                          
4 E.g. international humanitarian law, Schmitt, ‘Military Necessity and Humanity in International 
Humanitarian Law: Preserving the Delicate Balance’, 50 Virginia JIL (2010) 795; O’Connell, ‘Historical 
Development and Legal Basis’, in D. Fleck (ed), The Handbook of International Humanitarian Law (2013), at 1, 
36-8, or law of the sea, Chagos Marine Protected Area Arbitration (Mauritius v. UK), UNCLOS Annex VII Case, 
Award, 18 March 2015, at paras. 219, 309.     
5 Paparinskis, ‘The Limits of Depoliticisation in Contemporary Investor-State Arbitration’, 3 ESIL 
Proceedings (2010) 271.  
6 Corn Products International, Inc. v. Mexico, ICSID AF Case No. ARB/(AF)/04/1, Decision on Responsibility, 
15 Jan. 2008, Separate Opinion of Arbitrator Lowenfeld, 18 Aug. 2009, at para. 1; Ecuador v. US, 
UNCITRAL Arbitration, Expert Opinion of Professor Reisman, 24 Apr. 2012, at paras. 24-5, 37, 54; id., 
Expert Opinion of Professor Tomuschat, 24 Apr. 2012, at para. 32.   
7 Alvarez, ‘The Evolving BIT’ in I.A. Laird and T.J. Weiler (eds), Investment Treaty Arbitration and International 
Law (2010), at 1.  
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purpose, and other available materials, particularly by the background practice from other 
treaties and cases that informs ordinariness or specialty of particular expressions. The 
second qualification is that any interpreter, whether operating in an arbitral or a less 
formalised setting, will have to examine a variety of different rules – on jurisdiction, 
admissibility, scope and content of obligations, exceptions in primary rules, and 
applicable secondary rules – to determine the existence of responsibility or the success of 
a particular claim. A rule-by-rule comparison may miss the overall systemic effect of 
individual changes, e.g. the knock-on effect that changes to rules on jurisdiction, 
admissibility, or exceptions will have on the manner of issues that substantive obligations 
address. The third qualification is that not all rules bearing upon the meaning of the 
treaty and substantive and procedural consequences of its breach will be set out in the 
treaty itself. Interpretation of investment treaties may require drawing upon customary 
law on the issue8 or taking into account rules of other regimes of international law like 
international human rights law9 or international health law.10 Rules of State responsibility 
have sometimes been attributed interpretative significance11 and would, of course, apply 
as secondary rules.12 Tribunals may also be capable of drawing upon uncodified inherent 
powers to conduct proceedings.13  
Finally, the common woe of negotiators, namely to be misunderstood by 
adjudicators and legal writers,14 is particularly likely in investment law. Jurisdictional 
clauses are broad, adjudicators decentralised, and the application of rules to particular 
facts, rather than the more abstract exercise of interpretation, will often be of decisive 
importance in the formulation of treaty rules and their application in arbitral decisions.15 
                                                          
8 Saluka Investments BV (Czech Republic) v. Czech Republic, UNCITRAL Case, Partial Award, 17 March 2006, 
at paras. 254-62.  
9 Rompetrol Group v. Romania, ICSID Case No. ARB/06/3, Award, 6 May 2013, at paras. 168-72.  
10 Philip Morris Brand Sàrl (Switzerland) and others v. Uruguay, ICSID Case No. ARB/10/7, Procedural Order 
No. 3, 17 Feb. 2015, at paras. 23-4. 
11 Giovanni Alemanni and others v. Argentina, ICSID Case No. ARB/07/8, Decision on Jurisdiction and 
Admissibility, 17 Nov. 2014, at para. 316.  
12 Yukos Universal Limited (Isle of Man) v. Russia, PCA Case No. AA 227, Final Award, 18 Jul. 2014, at paras. 
1594-606, 1650-92, 1763-9.    
13 Brown, ‘Inherent Powers in International Adjudication’ in C. Romano et al. (eds), The Oxford Handbook of 
International Adjudication (2013), at 828.  
14 Fitzmaurice, ‘Vae Victis or Woe to the Negotiators! Your Treaty or Our “Interpretation” of It?’, 65 AJIL 
(1971) 358.  
15 Consolidated CETA Text (26 September 2014), available at: 
trade.ec.europa.eu/doclib/docs/2014/september/tradoc_152806.pdf, Art. X.9(2), (4), Annex X.11(2); 
Draft EU-Singapore FTA (October 2014), available at: trade.ec.europa.eu/doclib/html/152844.htm, Art. 
9.4(2), (5), Annex 9-A(2); Saluka, supra note 8, at paras. 266-75, 310-456, 464-96; Rompetrol, supra note 9, at 
paras. 270-80; Yukos, supra note 12, at paras. 1575-84; British Caribbean Bank Limited (Turks & Caicos) v. 
Belize, PCA Case No. 2010-18, Award, 19 Dec. 2014, at paras. 233-47, 279-84; Hochtief AG v. Argentina, 
ICSID Case No. ARB/07/31, Decision on Liability, 29 Dec. 2014, at paras. 209-88; Clayton and others v. 
Canada, PCA Case No. 2009-04, Award on Jurisdiction and Liability, 17 March 2015, at paras. 446-604.      
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Overall, in many instances the contentious issues will turn on the usual lawyerly 
techniques of identification of applicable law, interpretation, solution of conflicts, and 
application of law to facts (more often than not, within or with an eye to formalised 
dispute settlement, or in response to it), which may eventually strike – or undo – the 
balance.16 Careful ex ante attention to precise textual expression of particular clauses is, of 
course, an important element of this exercise. But to focus on that exclusively runs the 
danger of missing something important, just as telling the story of the European human 
rights law solely by comparing the language of the European Convention of Human 
Rights with its Protocols would.  
 
B. What Is Not Being Balanced  
 
My second broader concern relates to the conceptual aspects of the perspective of 
balancing. The strongest version of the criticism would be that balancing is not a 
freestanding and normatively neutral concept, and cannot be unreflectively taken as a 
given and merely applied.17 The intermediate criticism would call for greater clarity for 
what precisely is meant by balancing.18 I will not pursue these points here and assume 
that it is defensible to evaluate investment law from the perspective of balancing the 
interests of investors and States. I will merely draw attention to two perhaps slightly less 
obvious aspects of investment law that could have bearing on such an inquiry.   
The first relates to the scope of investment law: the all-important question of what 
the ‘investment’, protected by this regime of international law, is. The annulment 
committee in the Caratube v. Kazakhstan case recently noted that ‘[a] number of tribunals 
have reached the conclusion that the existence of an investment requires some inherent 
characteristics. … it is commonly accepted that contribution and risk assumption form 
part of the core elements which characterize an investment’.19 Indeed, a number of 
                                                          
16 Mills, ‘The Balancing (and Unbalancing?) of Interests in International Investment Law and Arbitration’ 
in Z. Douglas, J. Pauwelyn, and J. Viñuales (eds), The Foundations of International Investment Law (2014), at 
437.   
17 Cf regarding compliance, Kinsgsbury, ‘The Concept of Compliance as a Function of Competing 
Functions of International Law’, 19 Michigan JIL (1998) 345.  
18 ‘Balancing’ may apply to interests (whether of particular disputing parties or genus of parties), rights, 
values, policies, interpretative materials, tensions between obligations, regimes, or systems, balancing 
mandated by particular primary or secondary rules, or balancing of evidence. See a recent inter-State award, 
in which ‘balance’ was used to describe interests underpinning particular rules, Chagos, supra note 4, at 
paras. 219, 309, process of interpretation, id., at para. 502, application of primary obligations to particular 
facts, id., at paras. 528, 531, 534-5, 540, and the system of dispute settlement, id., Dissenting and 
Concurring Opinion of Judges Kateka and Wolfrum, at para. 45.    
19 Caratube International Oil Company v. Kazakshtan, ICSID Case No. ARB/08/12, Decision on the 
Annulment Application, 21 Feb. 2014, at para. 235.  
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important awards delineate the scope of the regime so as to exclude even significant 
economic activities if they are of insufficient economic contribution or duration, or are 
subject to no other risk than purely commercial.20 There may be scope for reasonable 
disagreement on whether this approach is reflective of jurisprudence constante in ICSID 
arbitration or investment arbitration more generally.21 But that disagreement is irrelevant 
for evaluating the EU practice, which explicitly delineates the scope of protection and 
consent to arbitration by incorporating the ‘characteristics of an investment’ into the 
chapeau of the definition of ‘investment’.22 Investments of insufficient duration, 
contribution, and risk will not be ‘investments’ that fall under the protective ambit of the 
EU treaties.   
The second observation relates to teleology and structure. The story told by most 
investment treaties in their preambles weaves together three strands: importance of legal 
protection provided, its relationship with the flows of capital, and the overall effect on 
the host State’s development.23 I would not want to overstate my point. There are 
differences in emphasis and formulation, and there are other strands present. Reciprocity 
appears explicitly through the deepening of economic relations, and implicitly through 
home States’ interest in the protection of their nationals. Indeed, reasonable people 
disagree on whether the teleology makes sense, will deliver on its promises, and is overall 
worth-while.24 Still, the lex lata does seem to view the existence of protection under 
international law as closely interlinked with the investor’s decision to make or retain an 
investment. Consequently, in a structural sense, (at least parts of) investment protection 
treaties may be better conceived of as pledges made by host States to influence or reward 
investors’ decisions.25 Taking these points together, investment treaties (are intended to) 
nudge or be nudged by particular decisions that inject investments so deeply into the 
legal and economic system of the host State as to necessarily subject them to significant 
risks going beyond the merely commercial. This dynamic has to be taken into account 
                                                          
20 KT Asia v. Kazakhstan, ICSID Case No. ARB/09/8, Award, 17 Oct. 2013, at paras. 188-223; Nova Scotia 
Incorporated (Canada) v. Venezuela, ICSID Case No. ARB(AF)/11/1, Award, 30 Apr. 2014, at paras. 90-7, 
105-13; Poštová Banka, AS and Istrokapital SE v. Greece, Award, 9 Apr. 2015, at paras. 360-71.   
21 Legum, ‘Of Definitions and Disregard: An Editorial’, 30 ICSID Rev (2015) 281.   
22 CETA, supra note 15, Art. X.3; EU-Singapore FTA, supra note 15, Art. 9.1.    
23 Texts of the most recent treaties provided by UNCTAD illustrate my point, available at: 
investmentpolicyhub.unctad.org/IIA/MostRecentTreaties.   
24 Poulsen, Bonnitcha, and Yackee, ‘Transatlantic Investment Treaty Protection’ (12 March 2015); Baetens, 
‘Transatlantic Investment Treaty Protection – A Response to Poulsen, Bonnitcha and Yackee’ (12 March 
2015), available at: www.ceps.eu/publications.  
25 Cf Brimlayer, ‘From ‘Contract’ to ‘Pledge’: The Structure of International Human Rights Agreements’, 
77 BYBIL (2006) 163.  
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when evaluating the balance struck, and an otherwise impeccable analysis of what treaties 
say may miss something important if it does not.26  
 
3. Brave New Europe 
 
In the investment treaty practice of post-2000 (investment law, as it were, after 
arbitration), States participating in the system have adopted two approaches: first, 
remained perfectly happy to continue in the usual manner (e.g. the traditional home 
States in Western Europe);27 secondly, finessed sources and content of obligations, added 
layers of substantive and procedural exceptions, and advanced transparency (Canada and 
the US).28 The first few months of 2015 have delivered two new approaches: India has 
reshaped the teleology of investment law around the right to regulate, setting out prima 
facie narrow substantive and procedural guarantees, interlinked with investors’ 
obligations;29 and Brazil has departed from the investor-State paradigm by concluding 
treaties that provide for inter-State dispute settlement only.30 Considered against this 
background, does the EU practice provide an innovative and coherent contribution 
worthy of its own separate chapter in the story of development of investment law? 
 
A. New Europe 
 
Titi’s highly competent discussion of the developments in the EU practice leads her to 
conclude that ‘it is probable that we stand at the threshold of a yet newer generation of 
international investment treaties, and one set to change the face of international 
investment law as we know it’. That may very well be so, but glimpses of the aesthetically 
                                                          
26 As Vaughan Lowe puts it, ‘it makes no sense to criticize a BIT for being an unbalanced instrument 
favouring investors at the expense of host States, if one looks only at the provisions of the BIT. … to 
criticize a BIT on the ground that it only gives rights to investors is like criticizing a screwdriver for only 
being useful for attaching screws’, Lowe, ‘Book Review of Commentaries on Selected Model Investment Treaties / 
edited by Chester Brown. ISBN 978-0-10-964519-0, £180.00’, 30 ICSID Rev (2015) 275, at 276.   
27 2003 Italy Model BIT; 2004 Netherlands Model BIT; 2006 France Model BIT; 2008 Germany Model 
BIT; 2008 UK Model BIT. Treaties and Model Treaties referred to in this and the following footnote are 
available at: investmentpolicyhub.unctad.org/IIA.  
28 2004 DR-CAFTA; 2004 Canada Model BIT; 2004 US Model BIT; 2012 US Model BIT. The 2007 
Norway’s attempt at a Model BIT could provide a European counterpart.  
29 2015 India Model BIT, available at: 
http://finmin.nic.in/the_ministry/dept_eco_affairs/icsection/Indian%20Model%20Text%20BIPA.asp.  
30 2015 Brazil-Mozambique BIT, available at: 
http://www.itamaraty.gov.br/index.php?option=com_content&view=article&id=8511&catid=42&Itemid
=280&lang=pt-BR; 2015 Brazil-Angola BIT, available at: 
http://www.itamaraty.gov.br/index.php?option=com_content&view=article&id=8520:acordo-brasil-
angola-de-cooperacao-e-facilitacao-de-investimentos-acfi-luanda-1-de-abril-de-2015&catid=42&lang=pt-
BR&Itemid=280.     
7 
 
enhanced future have been rather well disguised so far, and the existing practice shows a 
somewhat uneasy mixture of things new and old. Three examples taken from the section 
on substantive obligations should illustrate my point.  
First, the definition of expropriation in EU treaties follows the US-Canada approach 
(that in its own turn borrows from a 1978 US Supreme Court judgment).31 Why? Would 
it not make more sense for the EU to search for inspiration closer to home than 1970s 
Washington DC? It could have drawn upon European human rights law,32 itself of an 
equally respectable vintage33 and elaborated in quite a few international judgments dealing 
with (issues comparable to) investment protection.34 Secondly, the definition of most-
favoured-nation treatment in the CETA explains that substantive obligations in other 
treaties are not ‘treatment’, unless particular measures are adopted pursuant to them.35 
Why? The proposition that obligations in other treaties do constitute ‘treatment’ seems 
to be reflective of consensus in investment arbitration.36 What is the reason for such a 
sharp departure from a generally accepted reading of the clause, seemingly expressed in 
the form of an interpretation of the ordinary meaning, rather than an exception? Thirdly, 
the definition of fair and equitable treatment has been supplemented by an explanation 
of what conduct can constitute its breach.37 The idea of elaborating fair and equitable 
treatment in this manner is an interesting one (even if the pedigree and implications of 
some elements may be more obvious than others). But the effort to ensure greater 
predictability may be undercut by significant differences already present within the EU 
practice: ‘targeted discrimination’ in the CETA but not the Singapore FTA; a rule on 
                                                          
31 Penn Central Transportation Company and others v. New York City (1978) 438 US 104, at 123-8; 2012 US 
Model BIT Annex B; CETA, supra note 15, Annex X.11(2); EU-Singapore FTA, supra note 15, Annex 9-
A(2).      
32 Cf 2007 Norway Model BIT Art. 6.       
33 Case 44/79 Hauer [1979] ECR 3727, at paras. 17-30; App. Nos 7151/75 and 7152/75, Sporrong and 
Lönnroth v. Sweden ECHR Series A 52.       
34 See just in the Grand Chamber of the ECtHR in the last three years: App. No 54522/00, Kotov v. Russia 
[GC] Judgment 3 Apr. 2012; App. No 38433/09, Centro Europa 7 SRL and Di Stefano v. Italy [GC] ECHR 
Rep 2012; App. No 71243/01, Vistiņš and Perepjolkins v. Latvia [GC] ECHR Judgement 25 Oct. 2012; App. 
No 60642/08, Ališic and others v. Bosnia and Herzegovina and others [GC] ECHR Rep 2014. The US-Canada 
definition appears to have been applied in one case so far, Railroad Development Corporation (RDC) v 
Guatemala, ICSID Case No. ARB/07/23, Award, 29 June 2012, at paras. 79-152. 
35 CETA, supra note 15, Art. X.7(4).       
36 White Industries v. India, UNCITRAL Case, Final Award, 30 Nov. 2011, at para. 11.2. Most States do not 
even raise this particular point, MTD Equity Sdn. Bhd. and other v. Chile, ICSID Case No. ARB/01/7, 
Decision on Annulment, 21 March 2007, at para. 64; Rumeli Telekom and other v. Kazakhstan, ICSID Case 
No. ARB/05/16, Award, 29 Jul. 2008, at para. 575; EDF International SA and others v. Argentina, ICSID Case 
No. ARB/03/23, Award, 11 June 2012, at paras. 921-37; Arif v. Moldova, ICSID Case No. ARB/11/23, 
Award, 8 Apr. 2013, at para. 396; Apotex Holdings Inc. and other v. US, ICSID Case No. ARB(AF)/12/1, 
Award, 25 Aug. 2014, at paras. 9.66-71; Hesham Talaat M. Al-Warraq v. Indonesia, UNCITRAL Case, Final 
Award, 15 Dec. 2014, at paras. 540-555.    
37 CETA, supra note 15, Art. X.9(2), (4); EU-Singapore FTA, supra note 15, Art. 9.4(2), (5).      
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contractual breaches in the FTA but not in the CETA; and ‘legitimate expectations’ 
expressed as part of the obligation in the FTA but only something to be taken into 
account in application in the CETA. Overall, the EU practice is not without innovative 
ideas, but could benefit from closer attention to both the fine print and overall 
consistency.  
 
B. Brave Europe 
 
Thinking about the EU from behind a veil of ignorance, one could imagine a number of 
possible innovative futures for its investment law (some of which may be more likely 
than others in legal, political, and policy terms). The EU could nudge investment 
protection law towards a ‘Uruguay moment’, centralising and institutionalising its dispute 
settlement, in some ways similarly to multilateral trade. At the other end of the spectrum, 
it could move towards (for lack of a better word) a ‘Campbellian moment’, entirely or 
substantially dismantling mixed adjudication to return to the traditional inter-State 
regime.38 Or a generalist international lawyer’s perspective could be adopted, taking a 
step back to reflect upon the function that international law and dispute settlement could 
be expected to fulfil within this legal regime.39 Such an examination could possibly lead to 
modest conclusions about the role of this manner of adjudication, suggesting instead a 
focus on greater involvement of Parties (e.g., internalisation of investment law in 
bureaucratic decision-making and inter-Party consultations, lack-of-agreement-by-Parties 
precondition to claims, expectation of non-disputing Parties’ submissions, and a broad 
approach to permissibility of inter-Party arbitration). And there are smaller tweaks that 
could have significant systemic importance, e.g. elaborating the meaning of particular 
terms or concepts in a manner that non-parties could adopt or take into account in some 
legally relevant form.40 When the veil of ignorance is dropped, there is little that one 
could point to in the existing EU practice that could have such an impact as the US 
practice has had, or the recent Indian and Brazilian practice may have.   
                                                          
38 See SADC Case 2/2007, Mike Campbell (Ltd) and Others v. Zimbabwe [2008] SADCT 2, which led to the 
dismantlement of the individual-State aspects of the SADC Tribunal, de Wet, ‘The Rise and Fall of the 
Tribunal of the Southern African Development Community: Implications for Dispute Settlement in 
Southern Africa’, 28 ICSID Rev (2013) 45.  
39 H. Lauterpacht, The Function of Law in the International Community (2011); Lowe, ‘The Function of 
Litigation in International Society’, 61 ICLQ (2012) 209; G. Hernández, The International Court of Justice and 
the Judicial Function (2014).   
40 2015 Mauritius Convention on Transparency, available at: 
www.uncitral.org/uncitral/en/uncitral_texts/arbitration/2014Transparency_Convention.html; Lowe, id., 
at 216-9.   
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Titi is right that the EU has moved beyond the models of traditional home States of 
Western Europe. But the more important point may be that the sui generis elements of 
European constitutional and political order have not yet translated into qualitatively new 
contributions to international investment policy.41 Indeed, the lack of major surprises 
may be the most surprising aspect of the story so far. Whatever new faces may be lurking 
around the corner,42 the black letter of the existing EU practice is an update of the US 
practice of the last decade, better on some points than others – not that there’s anything 
wrong with that.   
 
                                                          
41 Rules on apportionment of financial responsibility between the EU and Member States may be an 
exception, in any event related to secondary rules of responsibility and (tertiary) rules of dispute settlement 
rather than primary rules of investment protection, Dimopoulos, ‘The Involvement of the EU in Investor-
State Dispute Settlement: A Question of Responsibilities’, 51 CMLR (2014) 1671.    
42 European Commission, ‘Concept Paper: Investment in TTIP and beyond – the path for reform’ (5 May 
2015) available at: http://trade.ec.europa.eu/doclib/docs/2015/may/tradoc_153408.PDF.   
